ANNEX 2. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the th MP Brigade. ANNEX 3. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:. U Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;.
U Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the th MP Brigade, as appropriate;. U Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate. ANNEX 4. These units are part of the th MP Brigade. The th MP Brigade operated these facilities. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment operations.
ANNEX U The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November , conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and corrections operations.
The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness.
These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations. U MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested by the Commander CJTF U Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and accountability.
U Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system. U Integration of military detention and corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run corrections system. U Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation standards. U Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees.
However, several important findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below emphasis is added in certain areas :. U Detainee Management including movement, segregation, and accountability. U There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various detention facilities.
Though, there were no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. U The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information between different categories of detainees.
MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer safety.
The th MP Battalion redeployed on 11 February and the remainder is scheduled to redeploy in March and April The units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component units do not have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a five-year period. Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees.
U EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to specifically articulated military necessity e. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.
Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state. The th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.
U Align the release process for security internees with DoD Policy. The process of screening security internees should include intelligence findings, interrogation results, and current threat assessment. U Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant. Establish procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.
In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. While clearly the th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done at lower levels.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. These actions, as will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements from military police and military intelligence personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team.
The photos and videos are not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of the th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions involving that command for the past several months.
On 7 February , the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February , at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training sessions on approved detention practices. I met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect potential evidence.
We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of witnesses from the th MP Brigade. On 17 February we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our investigation.
On 29 February we finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides. U The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison Baghdad Central Confinement Facility.
They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this abuse.
U In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the th MP Brigade, as well as members of the th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison.
We did not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of this investigation. Karpinski was the Commander of the th MP Brigade.
The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements ANNEX 26 and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation.
S I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts:. S Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;. S Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;. S Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;. S Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;.
S Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped;. S Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;. S Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;. S Using military working dogs without muzzles to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;. U These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and witness statements.
In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects ANNEX 26 :. Davis, nd MP Company - Suspect. England, nd MP Company - Suspect. U In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses ANNEX 26 :. U Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;.
U Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;. U Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick. U Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
U I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI interrogations.
U I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth.
The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain sic. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse. They answer every question. Stuff like that. Adel L. Nakhla , a US civilian contract translator was questioned about several detainees accused of rape.
During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. U Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, An extensive CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the th MP Battalion had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil Air Base.
He recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind th MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any evidence that LTC P Phillabaum, the commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding detainee treatment.
This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.
Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity to read the Convention. U That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures SOPs regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
U That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of detainee operations. U The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:.
U There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the th MP Brigade and its subordinate units. U The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the th MP Brigade AOR.
For proper accountability, it is imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number ISN counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers.
However, a detailed review of their operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented by the unit. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal [ He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain [sic].
Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse. Finally, SGT [ They answer every question. Stuff like that. During my tour at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first brought to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break them down.
Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. U Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, An extensive CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the th MP Battalion had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil Air Base.
He recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG [ Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG [ Nor is there any evidence that LTC P [ This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.
Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be given the full opportunity to read the Convention. U That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures SOPs regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
U That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of detainee operations. U The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the th MP Brigade AOR [Area of Responsibility].
This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the facility.
U The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities.
This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law. U Prior to BG [ At one point, approximately 7, to 8, detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June the th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several detention centers.
Morale suffered, and over the next few months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. Despite his proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG [ LTC P [ U During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview with BG [ What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers.
Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG [ On 17 January BG [ He found that incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC P [ Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff [ Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected. U That COL [ Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability. He determined that there was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees at Abu Ghraib BCCF were wanton acts of select soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and command insufficiencies.
U Approval and implementation of the recommendations of this AR Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments are essential to establish the conditions with the resources and personnel required to prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse. Discussion How would you qualify the conflict in Iraq at the time of the alleged abuses? Is the international humanitarian law IHL of international armed conflicts applicable to all detainees mentioned in the Taguba report? Does the report make a difference as to the treatment of the prisoners of war and that of the other detainees?
Does it make a legal distinction? What is the status of those not considered as prisoners of war?
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