Public Statements. Subordinate Data. Crisis to October Agreement - Shane Quinlan. Racak Massacre to the end of Rambouillet - Rebecca Lindgren. Decisions made typically center around the utility of a state's instruments of power. The DIME model is a traditional abstract categorization of actions based on aspects of national power. Army Techniques Publication For the State and Defense Departments, integrating all four elements of national power to achieve optimal negotiation outcomes is a highly complex and increasingly important requirement to achieve US strategic objectives given the disappearance of unconditional surrender and its nearly unlimited diplomatic yield to victorious states.
The teams would begin by defining the operational environment, including all actors and associated relationships, and conditions that compromise the current state.
Next they would describe the desired endstate. From here, DIMEPTs would frame the problem in order to identify and understand the issues impeding progress toward the desired endstate. Rather, the center of gravity could be, for example, a public sentiment, a particularly important segment of the economy, or a powerful ruling elite. DIMEPTs would continue the execution of Arm Design methodology by ascertaining decisive points of the operation, determining approaches, identifying defeat and stability mechanisms, and developing lines of operation and lines of effort.
DIMEPT-defined lines of operation will likely be mostly military in nature, leading to the control of geographic or force-oriented objectives, while lines of effort will lean toward diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts linking multiple tasks through a logic of purpose to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
From this point, DIMEPTs could transition to detailed planning, where lines of operation and lines of effort are tied together in time, space, and purpose on an execution matrix published at echelon throughout the unified DIMEPT chain of command. As an example, this execution matrix might show diplomatic meetings with allies of the adversary, timed to coincide with multiple official and social-media press releases; the military capture of key maritime trading vessels; cyber activities targeting key defense and government systems; and the beginning of an economic embargo.
By presenting multiple simultaneous dilemmas to the adversary through a comprehensive and detailed DIME approach, the US government and its allies would be in a far superior negotiating position without expecting large-scale combat operations alone to drive an adversary to the negotiating table. To do this, the Defense Department should embrace opportunities for institutionalized collaboration with other government stakeholders to converge all elements of national power in achieving an optimal negotiated settlement for the United States and its allies.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Scholars and practitioners much discuss terminology, with different specialists and different commands preferring influence or strategic communications. The public affairs and information operations specialists in the Department of Defense are well trained at their schoolhouses, but in my experience they exemplify a culture that incentivizes going it alone. Unaware of parallel work by others, they miss opportunities for cooperation. Public diplomacy at an embassy, in its Public Affairs Section, already has contacts in the media and society, knowledge of local patterns of communication, employees who understand different social and political groups, and bilingual staff.
The embassy can flag local sensitivities and brief commanders who meet the press. The public affairs outcome for a visit or deployment will always be better if it is worked together with the public diplomacy people at an embassy.
Understanding the need to integrate informational power into grand strategy, many advocate re-forming the U. Information Agency. During the Cold War, U. Information Agency was folded into the State Department.
Their Voice of America and the other U. The new organizational arrangements have engendered their own vested interests and turf protection which now slim prospects for necessary Congressional action. These political realities mean that unifying the four instruments may be a bridge too far, but better alignment is possible. The first steps in an alignment agenda are easy ones. Army Special Operations Command among them.
Once alignment begins, ideas should move from the bottom up, but the process can only be launched from the top down. At initial, highest-level meetings, each organization can discuss how it addresses a threat or an issue, preparing the ground for working groups, consultation, and planning.
The low-hanging fruit can be addressed first. Public affairs, public diplomacy, broadcasting, and information operations must educate one another in their professional schools. Exercises and simulations need role players from all four informational communities.
Personnel experts can arrange exchange tours to strengthen unified action in the future. At embassies, alignment means ensuring cooperation among all the embassy sections with information, awareness, education, and exchange programs. Skip navigation. Your browser is out of date. For the best and most secure experience in our catalog, please update your browser.
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